Chapter 1 Brothers United by Štiks, Igor
Štiks, Igor. "Brothers United: The Making of Yugoslavs." Nations and Citizens in
Yugoslavia and the Post-Yugoslav States: One Hundred Years of Citizenship. London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 25–36. Bloomsbury Collections. Web. 29 Jan. 2018. <http://
dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781474221559.ch-002>.
Downloaded from Bloomsbury Collections, www.bloomsburycollections.com, 29 January
2018, 16:32 UTC.
Copyright © Igor Štiks 2015. You may share this work for non-commercial purposes only,
provided you give attribution to the copyright holder and the publisher.
1
Brothers United: The Making of Yugoslavs
The revolver came from Serbia, but the finger that pulled the trigger that would 
kill Franz Ferdinand and thus announce the end of one world and the birth 
of another acted upon two strong beliefs. If one can judge from his statement, 
underage Gavrilo Princip, like so many of his peers, was foremost convinced 
that South Slavs should be liberated from a foreign yoke and unite in their 
own state; this belief was strongly though not articulately mixed with another 
conviction that the world about to come must be the world of profound social 
transformation. Two motives with which our story of ‘one hundred years of 
citizenship’ begins will be repeated in many different forms during this century: 
should South Slavs have their own common state? Or form separate ones? And, 
regardless of the answer, should political transformations entail more social 
equality or only a change of the rulers at the top of the existing hierarchy? Every 
idea often has deep roots and various historic materializations. One of the two 
ideas that materialized in that finger that eventually pulled the trigger on 28 June 
1914 had started its long voyage to Sarajevo almost a century before.
Brothers as aliens: From Yugoslavism to Yugoslavia
In contrast to the separate national projects that aspired, as did almost every 
nationalist movement, to the maximum degree of congruence between their 
(ethno)national groups and their respective states (Gellner 1983), i.e. movements 
that were both nation-building and state-building projects, Yugoslavism was 
ambivalent on this point from the very outset. Could Yugoslavism be described 
as a classical nationalist movement aiming at the creation of a distinct Yugoslav 
nation ideally living in its own sovereign state? If so, in this sense, it was not 
different from separate ethnic nationalisms but merely had a broader ethnic basis 
encompassing almost all South Slavs. Or, was it just a political project of South 
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Slavs which aimed at achieving the separate national and political emancipation 
of each group within a common and, therefore, more viable state?
It used to be easy to know when you were in Eastern Europe, as Andrew 
Wachtel pointedly reminds us in his original definition of this region without 
clear borders, because ‘Eastern Europe is that part of the world where serious 
literature and those who produce it have traditionally been overvalued’ (Wachtel 
2006: 4). Wachtel refers here to the traditional societal position held by writers 
across Eastern Europe. Their engagement was of paramount importance during 
the nation-building period (‘fathers of the nation’),1 in sharp contrast to the 
West (although sub-state nations there, such as Scotland, defy the rule) where 
the dominant civic type of nationalism propelled mostly political figures to the 
forefront of the nation-building process (though the role of the intelligentsia 
was always crucial). The South-Slavic lands were no exception to the general 
rule in Eastern Europe: modern nations were first imagined in the minds of 
small groups of writers, linguists and intellectuals against the trend of actual 
political conditions and, for these times, against all odds. As mentioned earlier, 
South Slavs were loyal to different masters and often distant capitals. Moreover, 
they were linguistically fragmented into a number of South-Slavic dialects; 
their respective bourgeoisies were thin and illiteracy was very high. Within 
such a politically dormant population, a number of regional intellectuals of 
Croat, Slovene and Serb origins, such as Ljudevit Gaj, Janko Drašković, Vuk 
Karadžić, Petar Preradović and Stanko Vraz, influenced by national movements 
in Germany, Italy and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, set in motion the ‘Illyrian 
awakening’ in the 1830s.
The guiding idea of the ‘Illyrianists’ who falsely believed that South Slavs 
were the descendants of an eponymous ancient Balkan people – that idea was 
also present earlier in Napoleon’s short-lived Provinces Illyriennes – was in 
harmony with the unquestioned principle of ethnic and linguistic nationalism: 
various groups speaking the same language and which manifested similar 
ethnic characteristics most probably constitute a people that should be united, 
culturally and politically, and, eventually, govern itself. However, the first task 
was precisely to create the common standard language that would then displace 
the web of dialects, some of which (e.g. the Croatian kajkavian, štokavian and 
čakavian dialects as well as Slovenian) had already developed rich literary 
traditions. Croatian writer Ljudevit Gaj and Serbian linguist Vuk Karadžić agreed 
on the necessity of one standard language for all South Slavs, the unavoidable 
loss of local richness notwithstanding, the basis for which they had found in the 
widespread štokavian dialect.
Brothers United: The Making of Yugoslavs 27
Although this decision corresponded to the dialect spoken by the majority 
of future Yugoslavs, the question of common language has remained a sensitive 
issue to this day. It revolves around the issue of whether it is the single language 
with regional varieties (the view held by all serious linguists), or actually every 
constituted nation speaks a similar but different language (the position held 
by nationalist linguists; on these disputes see Kapović 2010: 127–156; Kordić 
2010). One can easily guess that today’s nationalists still inhabit exactly the same 
nineteenth century mental trap as the ‘Illyrians’. For them also, peoples/nations 
are divided by separate languages and, consequently, separate nations must 
speak separate languages even if this requires introducing artificial differences. 
The others more or less subscribe to Croatian writer Miroslav Krleža’s ironic 
statement that Serbs and Croats are two peoples divided by one language and 
one God. In other words, political reality should be separated from the question 
of language that should develop freely and in mutual interaction of its different 
varieties.
Back in the 1830s, the above-mentioned intellectuals had a gigantic task. 
They were a tiny minority of the literate population with no political or 
institutional power. Imposing a new standard language without an army or 
an administration seemed the fruit of the pretentious imagination of overly 
ambitious intellectuals coming from deep, underdeveloped provinces of large 
empires. Nonetheless, the first serious consequence of imposing the standard 
language was the unbridgeable divide between Slovenes on the one hand 
(who with a few exceptions notwithstanding, generally opposed giving up the 
literary use of their own language) and Serbs and Croats on the other. They later 
accepted the štokavian standard, albeit bifurcated into the ijekavian (Croatia, 
Bosnia, Montenegro) and ekavian (Serbia) versions, and were often reluctant to 
give up the particularities of their local vocabularies and syntax. It is important 
to note that the ‘awakeners’ had enormous difficulties in naming the newly 
created standard language; a perennial problem for all subsequent generations. 
In the nineteenth century, in order to avoid using either a Serbian or Croatian 
name, and lacking alternatives that would satisfy everyone, they often called the 
language narodni jezik (people’s language), or naški or naš jezik (‘our’ language). 
In subsequent periods it was named ‘Serbo-Croatian’ – christened as such in 
1824 by a German linguist Jacob Grimm and accepted by Illyrians in the 1830s 
and later (Kordić 2010: 127) – and ‘Croato-Serbian’, ‘Serbian and Croatian’ and 
‘Croatian or Serbian’, until the 1990s when Yugoslavia’s successor states decided 
to name the language spoken on their territories solely by the name of their 
countries or their ethnic majorities; therefore, Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian and, 
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more recently, Montenegrin. International institutions today refer to these 
languages, for practical purposes, as BCS or BCMS and former Yugoslavs when 
speaking among themselves refer to it as naš jezik, like the people who ‘imagined’ 
them almost two centuries ago.
Today one is tempted to conclude that Yugoslavism never enjoyed even an 
initial advantage over the various South-Slavic nationalisms. Over the course 
of the nineteenth century Serbia constituted itself as autonomous and was in 
1878, together with Montenegro, recognized as an independent state. This, 
coupled with growing Slovenian and Croatian nationalist movements in the 
Habsburg lands and the Ottoman presence in most of the Balkans, proved to be 
an insurmountable obstacle to South-Slavic national unification. In Croatia in 
the second half of the nineteenth century, however, some of the most important 
cultural, political and literary figures such as the poet and politician Ivan 
Mažuranić, and even clerical leaders such as Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer and 
Father Franjo Rački, continued to work on the Yugoslav project. Strossmayer, 
for instance, was the founder or initiator of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, established in 1866 in Zagreb, and the University of Zagreb, established 
in 1874, as well as the generous benefactor of other South-Slavic intellectuals. He 
saw Zagreb as the cultural capital of South Slavs, regardless of possible political 
outcomes. Nevertheless, Croatian Yugoslavs had to face the emergence of the 
concurrent Croatian nationalism embodied in the powerful Party of the Rights.2 
This Party, led by influential Ante Starčević and Eugen Kvaternik, rejected any 
future unification of Croats with other South Slavs and based their programme 
solely on Croatian nation and state building. Separate Croatian nationalism 
had long-lasting partners in the Catholic Church – in spite of some notable 
exceptions such as Strossmayer and Rački – the  Croatian petty-bourgeoisie and 
among peasants. Although intellectually and culturally strong, the pro-Yugoslav 
group remained largely isolated from the wider masses. It experienced a second 
wind with a new generation of young Croatian politicians such as Ante Supilo, 
Ante Trumbić and Josip Smodlaka, who perceived political unification with 
Serbs as a means of preserving Croatian statehood and securing its national 
independence in the context of Hungarian and German dominance.
The decisive moment for the Yugoslav idea thus seemed to be its appropriation 
by competing nationalist programmes (Rusinow 2003: 13). Nevertheless, this 
moment was significantly delayed in independent Serbia and arrived only just 
prior to the First World War. The exception to this was the short-lived cooperation 
between the Serbian politician Ilija Garašanin and Strossmayer.3 It has been 
reported that Garašanin, mostly known as the author of the secret Serbian 
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expansionist programme ‘Načertanije’ [The Draft], suggested to Strossmayer the 
liberation of the South Slavs from the Turkish yoke and ‘unification of all South 
Slavs in one federal state’ (Prpa-Jovanović 1997: 46). If Garašanin was ready to 
make such an opening towards Habsburg South Slavs, Serbian politicians after 
him almost completely ignored Yugoslavism as a political project, or considered 
it only as a means of creating a larger and stronger Serbian state. Serbian 
Yugoslavism had to confront ‘Greater Serbianism’, the project of unifying the 
štokavian regions under Serbian rule (and excluding the kajkavian regions of 
Croatia and Slovenia).
At the turn of the century, in the decisive years preceding the First World 
War, several mutually exclusive conceptions of South-Slavic unity were thus 
proposed simultaneously. In the Habsburg West, there were demands for cultural 
and linguistic rights, political unification of the Habsburg South Slavs with or 
without Serbia, as well as some support for Austro-Marxist ideas. In the East, 
in Serbia, two orientations confronted one another: an ‘eastern’ one advocating 
the unification of Serbs and Bulgarians (adopted by Garašanin as well) and a 
‘western’ one demanding either a Greater Serbia or a large South-Slavic State 
with Serbia as its dominant region or Piedmont (Rajaković 1992).
It remains, nonetheless, questionable as to whether Yugoslavism really 
competed with other separate national projects or whether it was just their 
temporary complement under existing historical and political circumstances. 
Rusinow (2003) argues that Yugoslavism never truly passed through all three 
main stages of the classic nation-building process in Eastern Europe as defined 
by Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. The first stage of the model proposed by 
Hroch is marked by the appearance of a handful of intellectuals and writers; 
the second stage is characterized by the transmission and propagation of the 
national idea by ‘patriots’ who form movements and political parties; and, 
finally, in the third and final stage, the national programme acquires mass 
support. Against this scheme, the First World War and the subsequent fall of 
the great empires opened an unprecedented window of opportunity for the 
Yugoslav programme to come into being without requiring a preceding mass 
support. Without mass movements, the question that needed to be answered was 
the following: under what political form should this nation- and state-building 
programme, that suddenly had a chance to be realized, be implemented? In 
1917, the Corfu Declaration on the creation of a parliamentary constitutional 
monarchy of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was signed by, on one side, the 
Yugoslav Committee composed of mostly prominent Croatian artists and 
politicians such as Trumbić and sculptor Ivan Meštrović, and, on the other, 
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the Serbian government in exile presided over by Nikola Pašić. By that time, 
and especially a year later with the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes in December 1918, two types of Yugoslavism – unitarist and 
federalist – had already opposed one another and would continue to plague 
political relations in the inter-war Kingdom to the point of almost totally 
defeating, after merely two decades, the idea of Yugoslavia as state.
Brothers as citizens: The belated birth 
of Yugoslav citizenship
Advocates of an ‘integral’ Yugoslavism, backed up by Serbia, established 
a clear agenda. Yugoslavia was envisioned as a centralized state engaged in 
an integral Yugoslav nation-building process that could come in two forms: 
either smaller Yugoslav ‘tribes’ would join the larger Serbian nation or a new 
national identity should be created and, eventually, supersede all earlier ‘tribal’ 
identities. With regard to the latter version of the process, we must mention 
the efforts made to create a ‘synthetic’ Yugoslav culture based on recognizable 
but complementary elements of each separate culture. This approach is most 
famously represented in the works of Ivan Meštrović (for a detailed analysis 
see Wachtel 1998: 67–128). On the other hand, a vision of a decentralized 
and multinational Yugoslav state that would naturally take the form of a 
federation of distinct nations was opposed to any form of integralism. The 
former Habsburg subjects, for whom the end of the Austria–Hungarian 
Empire presented a historic opportunity to regain national independence in 
union with other South Slavs, were unsurprisingly in favour of the federalist 
Yugoslavism. After all, they had some experience in federalist politics and in 
limited autonomy and were not keen on transferring all their powers to the 
new centre. It is often said that Yugoslavia was a child of Croatian ideas and 
Serbian military power. As in other similar coalitions, the actual number of 
military divisions was the determining factor.
The first moments of disillusionment with the political and economic life 
in the common state dominated by the Serbian monarchy soon developed 
into a permanent crisis.4 The first Constitution of 1921, also known as the St. 
Vitus’ Day Constitution (Vidovdanski Ustav), essentially consolidated Belgrade’s 
dominance. It was adopted by a simple majority and was rejected by, among 
others, Croat parties and Communists. The Croatian grievances with Yugoslavia 
were channelled into massive support for Stjepan Radić’s Peasant Party that 
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vacillated from ‘the Peasant International’ to which Radić subscribed in Moscow 
in 1924 to a conservative-nationalist party. Since its birth, Yugoslavia had been 
under heavy pressure from its internal economic and political imbalances. It 
seems that ‘Croatians and Slovenes expected their economic position to win 
them political authority, while the Serbs expected their political authority to 
strengthen their economic position, mainly through the power of taxation’ 
(Prpa-Jovanović 1997: 54). The assassination of Radić by a Montenegrin deputy 
in the Yugoslav Parliament in 1928 only aggravated the already soaring tensions 
over the national question in Yugoslavia. Dejan Djokić warns, however, that it 
would be a mistake to view Yugoslavia’s problems only through the prism of 
the conflict between Serbs and Croats. These difficulties were equally a result 
of the clash between centralist and anti-centralist visions of Yugoslavism, and 
were a consequence not only of inter-tribal but also of intra-tribal political 
conflicts (2003: 139, 145; also Djokić 2007). One should also add that these 
events in Yugoslavia were also taking place in the context of a collision between 
Figure 1.1 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 1920–1922 
(Source: Wikimedia Commons).
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the growing Communist movement and conservative and increasingly fascist 
regimes in Europe.
The overall political crisis in inter-war Yugoslavia gave an opportunity to 
King Alexander to proclaim royal dictatorship on 6 January 1929 as a last-ditch 
attempt to consolidate Yugoslavia as nation-state and to balance and supersede 
embittered inter-ethnic relations. He officially renamed the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes as ‘The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’ (the name had already been 
widely used), reorganized the country into nine provinces based on geographic 
and not ethnic criteria and adopted the programme of integralist Yugoslavism. 
The King knew something else as well: no programme of national integration 
can succeed without the consolidation of a unified modern citizenship regime. 
For almost a decade, citizenship in Yugoslavia was undefined and citizens were 
still governed by the citizenship regimes left in place by now obsolete polities. 
To understand the situation, we have to step back in history to the first attempts 
by ailing Empires and newly autonomous principalities to construct a modern 
citizenship in this region.
The patchwork of different citizenship regimes, based on numerous 
citizenship laws and acts, many of which dated back to the mid-nineteenth 
century, regulated the citizenship status of inhabitants of the lands that would 
form the ‘first’ Yugoslavia in 1918. The 1879 Hungarian law on citizenship 
(Article ‘L’ (50)) was applied in Croatia, Slavonia, Vojvodina, Medjimurje and 
Prekmurje and Rijeka, whereas the Austrian laws on citizenship (Articles 28–32) 
from the 1811 (1867) Austrian Civil Code were in force in Dalmatia, Austrian 
Littoral, including Istria, and Slovene lands. In Serbia, citizenship was defined 
and regulated by the 1844 Civil code of the Kingdom of Serbia (the articles 
44, 45 and 48) and by the 1844 ‘Regulation on Serbian Naturalization and 
Release of the Serbs from their Fatherland [otačastvo]’ (Tepić and Bašić 1969: 
xxxvii). Curiously, Montenegro did not have a proper citizenship law; only a 
regulation on exceptional naturalization of foreigners was legally codified in the 
Constitution of The Principality of Montenegro. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, during 
the last decades of the Ottoman rule, the Tanzimat reforms brought the first 
taste of modern citizenship with the adoption of the Nationality Law in 1869 
(Sarajlić 2010: 2–3). After the Austrian occupation and annexation, articles 3 
and 4 of the 1910 Land Statute for Bosnia-Herzegovina regulated the question of 
‘Bosnian-Herzegovinian belonging’. After the Balkan wars, the Ottoman subjects 
in Kosovo, Sandžak and Macedonia came under either Montenegrin or Serbian 
rule. It is difficult to speculate about their formal status during these wars and in 
the First World War. The region was overrun by the Axis powers in 1915 – the 
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Serbian army retreated through Albania to Corfu – and was a theatre of some of 
the bloodiest war operations.
Following the founding of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 
1918, the citizenship issues that arose due to the dismemberment of Austria–
Hungary and the subsequent creation of new states were mostly settled by 
the peace treaties and inter-state treaties concluded by the Kingdom with its 
neighbouring countries.5 Peace treaties with Austria and Hungary established 
that a person who had the ‘homeland right’ or domicile (Heimatrecht 
in German; zavičajno pravo or zavičajnost6), which signified permanent 
municipal residence and a legal link between the individual and municipality 
or county where he or she lived – on former Austrian–Hungarian territory 
should have citizenship of the country currently exercising its authority on that 
very territory (Čepulo 1999: 797–806; Jovanović 1977: 11–12, 15). The treaties 
also established the right of option for adult persons and, more important after 
the dissolution of the multiethnic empires and during consolidation of new 
nation-states, the right of option for members of ethnic minorities to live in 
their kin-state, i.e. basically to emigrate to their kin-states. The peace treaty with 
Bulgaria specified that Yugoslav citizens would become permanent residents of 
the territories that were incorporated into Yugoslavia and would also be offered 
the right of option. Following the Rapallo Treaty with Italy, ethnic Italians from 
Dalmatia acquired the right of option for Italian citizenship without obligation 
to emigrate.
The above-mentioned laws and regulations on citizenship – enacted by the 
defunct Habsburg Empire and the post-Ottoman kingdoms in the making – 
remained in force in the Yugoslav lands for a decade after unification. On 21 
September 1928, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes finally enacted its 
own citizenship law that established a single Yugoslav citizenship (article 1).7 
The law had retroactive application. Its intention was to determine who had 
actually acquired and who had lost Yugoslav citizenship between 1 December 
1918 and 31 October 1928 (article 53). Yugoslav citizens consisted of all persons 
who on the day of unification had citizenship in the Kingdom of Serbia, the 
Kingdom of Montenegro, the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia and all others 
whose citizenship had been regulated by the Peace Treaties. Individuals in 
Kosovo, Sandžak and Macedonia became Yugoslav citizens if they lived in these 
territories until 1918. The municipal belonging or zavičajnost was the crucial 
instrument to establish Yugoslav citizenship for Slovenia, Croatia, Slavonia, 
Dalmatia and Vojvodina, and the land belonging was required in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The law also provided that ‘every citizen must have zavičajnost 
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in one of the Kingdom’s municipalities’. Proof of zavičajnost was a necessary 
requirement for the Kingdom’s authorities to issue a certificate of Yugoslav 
citizenship (article 4). Interestingly, zavičajnost remained an important legal 
device up until 1947–1948. It constituted the basis for the determination of 
individuals’ republican citizenships in federal Yugoslavia.
Precarious birth, fragile existence and the 
brutal death of the first Yugoslavia
The King’s dictatorship managed to construct a single citizenship regime as well 
as to administratively unify the country, but along the way the unification project 
acquired a lot of enemies. The King’s efforts were, eventually, a failure. Ten years 
of negative political experiences under the Serbian crown led to the King’s 
dictatorship being almost automatically associated with Serbian hegemony. 
It betrayed Croatian hopes for more autonomy and provoked complaints by 
Serbs whose democratic institutions had been suspended. In short, it was too 
little, too late. It was too little for Slovenians and Croats whose strong national 
consciousness required urgent political recognition; it was too late, because the 
prospects for an effective cultural and political Yugoslav unity had already faded. 
King Alexander’s assassination in Marseille in 1934, perpetrated by Croatian 
and Macedonian right-wing extremists, brought an abrupt end to his autocratic 
rule. In the years preceding the Second World War the leading politicians – with 
the Serb and Croat political elites in the driving seat – would engage in a number 
of attempts at reforming and preserving the state (see Djokić 2007: 171–268).
However, the national question did not disappear from the agenda; it 
remained and threatened, under the pressure of Nazism and Fascism, the very 
existence of Yugoslavia itself. In August 1939, on the eve of the Second World 
War, the Yugoslav government, led by Dragiša Cvetković, and leader of the 
Croatian Peasant Party, Vlatko Maček, signed the Agreement (Sporazum), 
the purpose of which was the satisfaction of Croatian demands for greater 
autonomy. It established a semi-independent Croatian Banovina. If this spelled 
the end of integral Yugoslavism and the beginning of the ‘federalization’ 
of Yugoslavia, as argued by Djokić (2003: 153), it failed to properly address 
the Slovenian and Macedonian questions, nor did the Sporazum offer any 
comprehensive plan for restructuring Yugoslavia. It was, again, an insufficient 
solution delivered too late.
Brothers United: The Making of Yugoslavs 35
The first Yugoslavia disappeared during eleven days in April 1941, swept 
away by yet another blitzkrieg by the Axis powers. Yugoslavia was divided 
between the occupying powers (Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria) that on 
the remaining territory established the puppet fascist Independent State of 
Croatia (NDH), together with a collaborationist regime in Serbia, and attached 
Kosovo to the Italian-occupied Kingdom of Albania. It did not seem plausible 
at the time that Yugoslavia would ever again be resurrected. However, and 
against considerable odds, two years later the Resistance movement led by the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) offered, amidst bloody inter-ethnic 
conflicts perpetuated at a massive scale by Croat fascists against Serbs, Jews 
and Roma, and followed by a series of massacres by different factions of Serb 
collaborationists, extremists and royalists against Muslims, Croats and Jews, 
a new federalist formula for a future (preferably socialist) re-unification of 
liberated Yugoslavia.
However, as I show in the following chapter, the road between the 1919 
founding congress of the CPY and its pivotal wartime role in re-establishing 
Yugoslavia was far from straight. It is crucial to unearth this ideological and 
political development to explain how it was at all possible to resurrect Yugoslavia 
as political project after the initial failure. Without this ideological and political 
background, that has been often neglected by scholars of Yugoslavia, the 
idea behind federal Yugoslavia and its federalized citizenship, the evolution 
of its federal institutions over next four decades as well as the dynamic of its 
disintegration, cannot be properly understood.

